CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ ON WAR
The Genesis of On War
Peter Paret
Despite its comprehensiveness, systematic approach, and precise style, on war is not a finished work, that its was never completed to its author's satisfaction is largely explained by his ways of thinking and writing. Clausewitz was in his early twenties when he jotted down his first thoughts on the nature of military processes and on the place of war in social and political life. A pronounced sense of reality, skeptical of contemporary assumpotions and an equally undoctrinaire fascination with the past, marked these observations and aphorisms and lent them a measure of internal consistency; but it would not be inappropriate to regard his writings before 1806 as csscntiailv isolated insights~ building blocks for a structure that had not yet been designed.
The presence of a few of his earliest ideas in On War suggests the conscquentiahty with which his theories evolved, though in the mature: work these ideas appear as components of a dialectical process that Clauscwitz had mastered in the course of two decades and adapted to his own pur poses. An example is his concept of the role genius plavs in war, which hes near the source of his entire theoretical effort. Survivors of a somewhat different kind are his definitions of strategy and tactics, which he First formulattd when he was twenty four, or the characteristically unromantic comparison of war to commercial transactions, dating from the same time. Most of his early thoughts, however, expanded and acquired new facets in the years between Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia and the Russian campaign. Clausewitz was a member of the ioose alliance of reform-miuded civilians and soldiers who attempted with some success to modernize Prussian institutions at this time, and his manifoid activi« ties as staff ofhcer, administrator, and teacher further stimulated his intellectual interests and his crmtivity. Numerous passages from memoranda, lectures, and essays written during the reform era reappear, barely changed, in On War. After 1815, by which time his manuscripts 0n politics, history, philosophy, stmtcgv, and tactics ran into thousands of pages, Clauscwitz set to work on a collection of essays analyzing various aspects of war, which gradually coalesced into a comprehensive theory that sought to dehnc universal, permanent elements in war on the basis of a realistic interpretation of the present and the past. In the course of
a decade, he wrote six of eight planned parts, and drafted the remaining two. By 1827, however, he had developed a new hypothesis on what he called the “dual” nature of war, the systematic exploration of which de manded a far‘reaching revision of the entire manuscript. He died before he could rewrite more than the first chapters of Book One.‘
On War thus presents its author’s thoughts in various stages of completion. They range from the magnificent opening sequence of logically unfolding propositions to the rich but at times one-sided or contradictory discussions of Books Two through Six, to the essayistic chapters of the last two books, which suggest with brilliant strokes what a final version might have contained. Nothing can take the place of this unwritten version; but we should remember that Clausewitz’s decision in 1827 to re vise his manuscript had not implied a rejection of earlier theories-he only meant to expand and refine them. As we read the present text of On War, we can at least approximate Clausewitz’s intention by keeping his closely related hypotheses of the dual nature of war and of its political character clearly in mind. It will be useful, at the end of this discussion, to return to his ultimate hypotheses and outline their most significant aspects, the more so since he never fully developed their implications to theory.
That, despite the unevenness of its execution, On War offers an essentially consistent theory of conflict is indicative of the creative power of Clausewitz’s method and ideas. Anyone prepared to enter into his man
The presence of a few of his earliest ideas in On War suggests the conscquentiahty with which his theories evolved, though in the mature: work these ideas appear as components of a dialectical process that Clauscwitz had mastered in the course of two decades and adapted to his own pur poses. An example is his concept of the role genius plavs in war, which hes near the source of his entire theoretical effort. Survivors of a somewhat different kind are his definitions of strategy and tactics, which he First formulattd when he was twenty four, or the characteristically unromantic comparison of war to commercial transactions, dating from the same time. Most of his early thoughts, however, expanded and acquired new facets in the years between Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia and the Russian campaign. Clausewitz was a member of the ioose alliance of reform-miuded civilians and soldiers who attempted with some success to modernize Prussian institutions at this time, and his manifoid activi« ties as staff ofhcer, administrator, and teacher further stimulated his intellectual interests and his crmtivity. Numerous passages from memoranda, lectures, and essays written during the reform era reappear, barely changed, in On War. After 1815, by which time his manuscripts 0n politics, history, philosophy, stmtcgv, and tactics ran into thousands of pages, Clauscwitz set to work on a collection of essays analyzing various aspects of war, which gradually coalesced into a comprehensive theory that sought to dehnc universal, permanent elements in war on the basis of a realistic interpretation of the present and the past. In the course of
a decade, he wrote six of eight planned parts, and drafted the remaining two. By 1827, however, he had developed a new hypothesis on what he called the “dual” nature of war, the systematic exploration of which de manded a far‘reaching revision of the entire manuscript. He died before he could rewrite more than the first chapters of Book One.‘
On War thus presents its author’s thoughts in various stages of completion. They range from the magnificent opening sequence of logically unfolding propositions to the rich but at times one-sided or contradictory discussions of Books Two through Six, to the essayistic chapters of the last two books, which suggest with brilliant strokes what a final version might have contained. Nothing can take the place of this unwritten version; but we should remember that Clausewitz’s decision in 1827 to re vise his manuscript had not implied a rejection of earlier theories-he only meant to expand and refine them. As we read the present text of On War, we can at least approximate Clausewitz’s intention by keeping his closely related hypotheses of the dual nature of war and of its political character clearly in mind. It will be useful, at the end of this discussion, to return to his ultimate hypotheses and outline their most significant aspects, the more so since he never fully developed their implications to theory.
That, despite the unevenness of its execution, On War offers an essentially consistent theory of conflict is indicative of the creative power of Clausewitz’s method and ideas. Anyone prepared to enter into his man
1 Much of the older literature on the different phases of the writing of On War is based on inadequate sources and can be disregarded. Still valuable today is the short book by R. v. Caemmerer, Clausemtz (Berlin, 1905), and the suggestive article by H. Rosinski, "Die Entwicklung von Clausewitz’ Werk ‘Vom Kriege' im Lichte seiner 'Vorreden’ und ‘Nachrichten,’ " Historische Zeitschrift, 1,51 (1935). pp. 278-2%;, which was amended in important respects by E. Kessels response “Zur Entste ungsgcschichte von Clauscwitz’ Verk vom Kriege," Hitterische Zeitschrift, 192 (1933), pp. 97-100. W. M. Schering’s speculations in his anthoiogy of Clausewitz's writings, Geist und Tat (Stuttgart, 194:), are full of contradictions and factual errors; but since Schen'ng was familiar with Clausewitz’s unpublished drafts and seems to have been the last scholar to work on them before they disappeared at the end of the Second Vorld Wat, his interpretations cannot be ignored. In a knowledgeable essay “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. E. M. Earle (Princeton. 1943), pp. 93-113, H. Rothfels writes (p. 108, n. 65): “Clausewitv revised Book Eight and parts at least of Book One (probably Chapters One-Three) and of Book Two (certainly Chapter Two)." But he adds that Clausewitz regarded only Book One, Chapter One as complete I believe that Rothfels considerably over states the extent of Clausewitz's revisions after 1827. He gives no reason for his views other than internal evidence, but the passage from Book Eight he cites as proof of a late revision can be found in almost identical form in Clausewitz‘s manuscript on strategy of 1804. The best informed evaluation of the entire question, incorporating the findings of a centu of scholarship. is contained in E. kessel's brilliant “Zur Genesis 66: modernen kriegslehre,” Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschdu, 3 (195;), “09, PP405-413.
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